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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1636 
___________ 
 
TIMOTHY E. TRIMBLE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
JACK SHAW, OSCE Official;  
DANIEL N. RICHARD, Director in Personal capacity, other unknown  
officials in their personal capacity for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania;  
JOSEPH SIGNORE; SUSAN LAMPING; JEFFREY DESANZO; LOU PASQUELIN; 
JAN HOFFMAN; CAROLE COLLELLA; ATTORNEY URICK, in personal capacity, 
other unknown officials in their personal capacity of Beaver County, Pa. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-00172) 
District Judge:  Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
August 12, 2014 
 
Before:  JORDAN, COWEN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: August 14, 2014 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
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 Timothy E. Trimble initiated a civil action in the United States District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania in March 2013.  In his second amended in forma 
pauperis complaint, Trimble sued the defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in relation 
to allegedly unconstitutional actions that occurred in, and as a result of, his 1993 divorce 
proceedings.  Essentially, he objected to how the divorce proceedings were conducted in 
the 1990s, including the role of the domestic relations hearing officers in his case.  He 
also complained about the garnishment of his wages and Social Security disability 
payments through July 2010.  He submitted lengthy appendices to the District Court in 
support of his claims that included his correspondence on these and related matters from 
1993 until 2010.    
 The defendants (all but Shaw, who had not been served) filed motions to dismiss 
the second amended complaint, arguing, inter alia, that Trimble’s claims were time-
barred.  A Magistrate Judge issued a report, recommending that the motions be granted 
because Trimble’s claims were untimely on the face of the complaint.  The Magistrate 
Judge also stated that the claims against Shaw be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e) on the same basis.  Trimble objected, arguing, among other things, that his 
claims could be considered timely because he did not immediately discover some of the 
alleged wrongdoing and also because he had been too depressed to appreciate the 
ramifications of the defendants’ action.  Regarding the time-bar, in his second amended 
complaint, he additionally noted that he did file a complaint in a federal district court in 
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Florida within two years of 2010.  The District Court rejected Trimble’s objections, 
adopted the report and recommendation, and dismissed the complaint.  Trimble twice 
sought reconsideration, which the District Court twice denied.
1
  Trimble appeals. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the order dismissing Trimble’s second amended complaint.  See 
McGovern v. City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  Generally, our review of an order denying a motion for 
reconsideration is for abuse of discretion, but, to the extent the denial is based on the 
interpretation and application of a legal precept, our review is plenary.  See Koshatka v. 
Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 762 F.2d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1985).  We review orders denying 
appointment of counsel for abuse of discretion.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 n.4 
(3d Cir. 1993).  Upon review, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 The District Court properly dismissed the complaint because Trimble’s claims 
were time-barred on the face of his second amended complaint.  If a plaintiff’s 
allegations, taken as true, show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations, a complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.  See Jones v. 
Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); see also, e.g., Bethel v. Jendoco Constr. Corp., 570 F.2d 
1168, 1174 (3d Cir. 1978).  Furthermore, although the running of the statute of 
limitations is an affirmative defense, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c), where that defense is 
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 In the course of the proceedings, the District Court also denied Trimble’s motions to 
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obvious from the face of the complaint and no development of the record is necessary, a 
court may dismiss a time-barred complaint sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.  See, e.g., Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 
1258 (10th Cir. 2006); cf. Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 459-60 (3d Cir. 2013) (ruling 
that a dismissal for failure to state a claim based on an affirmative defense that is clear on 
the face of a complaint can constitute a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)).   
 Trimble’s claims, made pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983, are governed by 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 5524(2), Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations for tort actions.  See 
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009); Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified 
Fed. Agents, Emps. or Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1087 (3d Cir. 1988).  They accrued when 
he knew or should have known of the injuries on which his claims are based.  See 
Sameric Corp. v. Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).   
 All of Trimble’s claims accrued more than two years before he filed his civil 
action in the District Court.  Some of the claims accrued decades ago.  At the latest, his 
most recent claims, those relating to the garnishment, accrued in July 2010.  See 
Complaint at 29 (“The last action that beaver [sic] County had taken on this case 
occurred July 6, 2010.”)  Considering his allegations, we conclude that Trimble knew of 
any injuries at the times described in his complaint.  Although he states that he could not 
discover the claims previously, his allegations and the voluminous appendices with his 
                                                                                                                                                  
appoint counsel.   
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detailed correspondence about these matters throughout the decades belies that claim, 
including his argument that depression impeded his awareness.  That Trimble filed a 
complaint in another district court previously does not change the date he initiated this 
action.
2
  For these reasons, the District Court properly dismissed Trimble’s second 
amended complaint as time-barred.   
 Furthermore, the District Court properly denied reconsideration because Trimble 
did not present a basis for it.  See Max’s Seafood Cafe by Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 
176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d Cir. 1999).  Also, because the applicable statute of limitations 
clearly barred Trimble’s complaint, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying appointed counsel.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(explaining that before appointing counsel, a court must, as a threshold matter, determine 
if a case has arguable merit in fact and in law).  
 For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.   
 
                                              
2
 In his reply brief, Trimble also presents an argument that he suffers a “continuing 
wrong” that would make his claims timely.  First, it does not appear that he presented this 
argument in his opening brief or in the District Court.  As we have explained, absent 
compelling circumstances, which are not present here, we will not consider issues raised 
for the first time on appeal.  See Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. United States, 182 F.3d 212, 219 
(3d Cir. 1999).  Also, issues in dispute on appeal should be raised in an opening brief, not 
in reply.  See, e.g., Ethypharm S.A. Fr. v. Abbott Labs., 707 F.3d 223, 231 n.13 (3d Cir. 
2013) (explaining that issues not so raised may be considered waived).  Lastly, we note 
that although Trimble uses the term “continuing wrong,” he does not present a case that 
fits within the doctrine.  See Island Insteel Sys., Inc. v. Waters, 296 F.3d 200, 214 n.8 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (describing the doctrine).   
